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Yu IZUMI
1. Introduction
This paper examines the linguistic basis for epistemic contextualism from a crosslinguistic perspective. 
Epistemic contextualism or contextualism about knowledge attributions is a thesis concerning natural 
language, according to which the proposition expressed by the use of knowledge-attributing (and 
knowledge-denying) sentences varies from context to context in an epistemologically distinctive way. 
Epistemic contextualism has been defended mainly through the ordinary use of the English knowledge 
verb know. 1  Jason Stanley, however, criticizes epistemic contextualism for lacking good linguistic reason 
to take know to be a context-sensitive expression. 2
In this paper, pace Stanley, I defend the thesis that knowledge attributions are analyzed as a species of 
modal expressions, such as must, which are widely held to be context-sensitive.  Let us call the thesis 
ʻmodal contextualismʼ.  I argue that modal contextualism holds for Japanese.  Thus, epistemic contextualism 
is correct at least in a limited domain.
To specify the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions, the epistemic contextualist has to engage in 
the analysis of the verb know.  The lexical semantics of know is, however, not a simple linguistic exercise. 3 
This is partly because know is an atomic expression whose underlying structure is not transparent.  In 
contrast, the knowledge verb in Japanese sitteiru is morphologically complex, consisting of the verb-stem 
si- together with the aspectual and tense morphemes -te-i-ru.  We can decompose the term into its parts and 
1 Among others, Keith DeRose is a leading proponent of epistemic contextualism.  See DeRose, K., The Case for 
Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, volume 1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
2 Stanley, J., “On the linguistic basis for contextualism” in Philosophical Studies, 119(1-2), 2004, pp.119-146; Stanley, J., 
Knowledge and Practical Interest, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
3 Peter Ludlow emphasizes the complexity of the linguistic data concerning occurrences of know.  Ludlow, P., “Contextualism 
and the new linguistic turn in philosophy” in Preyer, G. and Peter, G., editors, Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, 
Meaning, and Truth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.11-50.
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examine what role each part plays in knowledge attributing sentences.  Thus, arguably, we have easier 
access to the underlying structure of Japanese knowledge attributions than that of English counterparts 
because the apparent morphological structure might as well reflect the underlying semantic structure. 4
In Section 2 I will present a modal analysis of Japanese knowledge attributions.  The analysis is based on 
Atsuko Nishiyamaʼs analysis of the Japanese aspect marker -te-i-, which in turn essentially relies on Paul 
Portnerʼs Kratzerian modal analysis of the progressive. 5  Nishiyamaʼs semantics entails that Japanese 
knowledge attributions quantify over context-sensitive ʻinertia worldsʼ, with which we understand 
progressive sentences.  The modal analysis accounts for our shifting intuitions concerning the truth-values 
of one and the same knowledge attributing sentence in different contexts.  In Section 3 I will introduce 
Stanleyʼs main argument against epistemic contextualism and show that it cannot be reproduced for 
Japanese knowledge attributions once we grasp the characteristics of the quantificational domains for 
knowledge attributions. 
2. Modal Contextualism
2.1 Basic facts about Japanese knowledge attributions 
For present purposes, the most important feature of Japanese knowledge attributions is that the 
expression corresponding to know in Japanese is morphologically complex and contains the aspect marker 
-te-i-.  The presence of -te-i- is necessary for forming a knowledge attribution.  If the knowledge verb does 
not come with -te-i-, it does not produce the ʻS knows that pʼ interpretation.  (1a) is an ordinary 
propositional knowledge attribution in Japanese, analogous to the English S knows that p construction. 
Consider (1b), which is exactly like (1a) except that it lacks the -te-i- morpheme.  (1b) does not express an 
ordinary propositional knowledge attribution; it seems to describe Rintaroʼs realization of the fact that Elise 
came.  The verb stem si- on its own corresponds rather to an eventive verb such as find out, learn, realize, 
or discover than the stative verb know in English. 
 (1) a. Rintaro-wa Elise-ga kita koto-o si-te-i-ru.
   Rintaro-Top Elise Nom came Nominalizer-Acc si-te-i-Nonpast
   ʻRintaro knows that Elise came.ʼ
4 Certainly, at the end, we have to be very cautious about what we can legitimately conclude of knowledge attributions in gen-
eral on the basis of Japanese knowledge attributions.  The same point, however, holds for all past studies that involve an oc-
currence of know or knowledge in English.  Is there any difference between Japanese and English knowledge attributions? 
What accounts for such a difference?  Is it a pragmatic, semantic or syntactic fact?  I cannot address such questions in this 
paper.  At any rate it is likely to be beneficial for us to study knowledge attributions in other languages than English, besides 
examining ever more subtle and complex data concerning knowledge attributions from English speakers.
5 Nishiyama, A., “The meaning and interpretations of the Japanese aspect marker -te-i-” in Journal of Semantics, 23, 2006, 
pp.185-216; Kratzer, A., “What ʻmustʼ and ʻcanʼ must and can mean” in Linguistics and Philosophy, 1(3), 1977, pp.337-356; 
Kratzer, A., “Partition and revision: The semantics of counterfactuals” in Journal of Philosophical Logic, 10(2), 1981, 
pp.201-216; Portner, P., “The progressive in modal semantics” in Language, 74, 1998, pp.760-787.
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  b. Rintaro-wa Elise-ga kita koto-o si-ru.
   ʻRintaro finds out/will find out that Elise came.ʼ
The suggestion that si- itself is a predicate of events is corroborated by the following contrast. 
 (2) a. ??Watasi-wa gakko-de/mokuyobi-ni mizu-ga H2O dearu koto-o si-te-i-ta.
       I-Top school-at/Thursday-on  water-Nom H2O is Nominalizer-Acc si-te-i-Past
   Literally ʻI knew that water is H2O at school/on Thursday.ʼ
  b. Watasi-wa gakko-de/mokuyobi-ni mizu-ga H2O dearu koto-o si-ta.
   I-Top school-at/Thursday-on water-Nom H2O is  koto-Acc si-Past
   ʻI learned that water is H2O at school/on Thursday.ʼ
The composite knowledge phrase si-te-i-ru is incompatible with a spatial or temporal modifier, such as ʻat 
schoolʼ, as in (2a), whereas the verb si- alone is compatible with such modifiers, as in (2b).  This is 
unsurprising given the stative know is often regarded as an individual-level predicate, which is incompatible 
with a spatiotemporal modifier. 6 
Since -te-i- is necessary for forming ordinary knowledge attributions in Japanese, now I turn to the roles 
of -te-i- within sentences.
2.2 The semantics of -te-i-
The aspect marker -te-i- in Japanese is associated with both progressive and perfect interpretations. 
 (3) Ken-ga hashi-te-i-ru.
  Ken-Nom run-te-i-Nonpast 
  a. ʻKen is running.ʼ
  b. ʻKen has (already) run.ʼ 7
(3) has two different readings: one of them corresponds to the English present progressive (3a), and the 
other corresponds to the present perfect (3b).  Any adequate analysis of -te-i- must account for both 
progressive and perfect interpretations.
Nishiyama presents such an analysis of -te-i-, whose two main components are Davidsonian event 
semantics and Portnerʼs modal analysis of the progressive.  Let me first briefly introduce the former 
component.  She adopts a standard form of Davidsonian event semantics, in which verb phrases express 
predicates of events or states (so-called ʻeventualitiesʼ) and thematic arguments and adverbial phrases 
6 Kratzer, A., “Stage-level and individual-level predicates” in Carlson, G. and Pelletier, F. J., editors, The Generic Book, 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), pp.125-175. 
7 Nishiyama, op. cit., pp.185-6.
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modify eventualities. 8  Additionally, following Manfred Krifka, 9 she assumes there to be part-whole 
relations among events.  We will see below that this partonomic assumption plays an important role in 
explaining the multiple interpretations of -te-i-.
Now I turn to the second component of Nishiyamaʼs analysis of -te-i-.  Portner adopts David R. Dowtyʼs 
modal analysis of the progressive, according to which the progressive morpheme is a kind of necessity 
operator: a progressive sentence is true at world w and time t just in case the corresponding nonprogressive 
sentence is true in all ʻinertia worldsʼ of w at t.  Inertia worlds of a world at a certain time t are exactly like 
the world up to t and ʻthe future course of events after this time [t] develops in ways most compatible with 
the past course of eventsʼ. 10  Inertia worlds basically represent our expectations of the future.  Portner 
presents Dowtyʼs analysis in event semantic terms.  For example, according to Portner,
 (4) Ken was crossing the street. 
is true at w and t iff there was an event at w and t that is an ongoing proper part of Kenʼs crossing of the 
street in all inertia worlds of w and t, where things proceed normally without any unexpected interruption 
of the event.  In other words, (4) is true iff we expected what Ken was doing to amount to the crossing of 
the street, whether he in fact succeeded in doing so in the actual world.  These truth-conditions seem 
compatible with our ordinary use of (4).
Portnerʼs underlying assumption is Kratzerʼs theory of modality, according to which a modal expression, 
such as can, is context-sensitive; the set of possible worlds that a modal sentence quantifies over depends 
on the context of use.  So inertia worlds for the progressive are also dependent on the context.  Then, how 
is a set of inertia worlds contextually selected?  A set of inertia worlds is doubly relativized to two 
conversational backgrounds: a modal base and an ordering source.  A modal base for a progressive 
sentence, often represented as ʻf(e, φ)ʼ, is the set of propositions concerning the circumstances that are 
relevant to whether event e is completed as an event satisfying eventuality description φ given the context 
of use.  With respect to an ordinary use of (4), f(e, φ) includes the propositions such as ʻKen is in good 
8 Davidson, D., “The logical form of action sentences” in Rescher, N., editor, The Logic of Decision and Action, (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp.81-95, republished in Davidson, D., Essays on Actions and Events, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980); Bach, E., “The algebra of events” in Linguistics and Philosophy, 9(1), 1986, pp.5-16; Parsons, T., 
Events in the Semantics of English, (Cambridge: Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1990).  Nishiyama uses an intensional ver-
sion of event semantics.  For example, something like (b) represents the semantic structure of (a).  (b) stands for a proposi-
tion that is true at world w iff there is a past event of Johnʼs arriving in w.
  (a) John arrived. 
  (b) λw∃e(PAST(e) ∧ e is Johnʼs arriving in w)
9 Krifka, M., “Nominal reference, temporal constitution, and quantification in event semantics” in Bartsch, R., van Benthem, 
J., and van Emde Boas, P., editors, Semantics and Contextual Expression, (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1989), pp.75-115; 
Krifka, M., “The origins of telicity” in Rothstein, S. D., editor, Events and Grammar, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 1998), pp.197-235. 
10 Dowty, D., Word Meaning and Montague Grammar, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), p.148.
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physical conditionʼ, ʻKen intends to cross the streetʼ, ʻThe pedestrian light is greenʼ, ʻThe street is crossableʼ, 
ʻKen started walking toward the other side of the streetʼ, etc. 11  When we consider whether (4) is true, we 
would certainly consider such factors.
An ordering source, represented as ʻg(e, φ)ʼ, encodes our normal expectations concerning the completion 
of e as φ given the context.  g(e, φ) can be seen as ʻthe set of outside factorsʼ that need to hold for e to 
culminate as φ in the context. 12  As for the example under consideration, g(e, φ) includes the propositions 
such as ʻKen does not slip and hurt his ankleʼ, ʻKen does not turn aroundʼ, ʻKen does not get hit by a truckʼ, 
etc. 13  If we donʼt assume such propositions, there would always be many remote possibilities in which Ken 
failed to cross the street, and (4) would never be true.  Perhaps in the actual world, Ken was hit by a truck 
and failed to cross the street.  But such an intrusion is rare and can be ignored.  When we consider whether 
(4) is true, we would exclude a number of remote possibilities that could prevent Ken from performing the 
described action.
The set of inertia worlds (ʻI(e, φ)ʼ), is obtained by imposing an order to f(e, φ) by means of g(e, φ). 
Roughly speaking, the subsets of worlds in f(e, φ) are ordered in accordance with the criterion of how 
many propositions in g(e, φ) hold. 14  I(e, φ) is the best subset of f(e, φ), where as many propositions in g(e, 
φ) as possible hold. 15  Since f(e, φ), g(e, φ), and hence I(e, φ) are contextually determined, a progressive 
sentence, such as (4), is context-sensitive.
There are various ways in which contexts influence I(e, φ) and hence the truth-conditions of (4).  Let me 
mention one such case.  Ordering source g(e, φ) shifts from context to context because what counts as an 
outside factor in one context is a relevant factor in another.  Suppose that (4) is uttered at the height of the 
Cold War, where the street is the border between Western and Eastern Berlin.  People have great difficulty 
in crossing the border because of the tight security.  In fact most people who attempted to cross the border 
have been hit by a truck.  In this context g(e, φ) does not include the proposition ʻKen is not hit by a truckʼ 
because that is not something we could expect to hold in the scenario.  I(e, φ) thereby includes both types 
of worlds where Ken is and is not hit by a truck.  Since in some inertia world Ken is hit by a truck and fails 
to cross the street, (4) is false in this context.  We indeed tend to judge (4) to be false in this context.  We 
11 Portner, op. cit., p.780.
12 Ibid., p.773.
13 Ibid., p.781.
14 For more details, see Kratzerʼs articles, op. cit.
15 Note that f(e, φ) does not necessarily include all the propositions that hold at the world of utterance; it includes only those 
relevant to the completion of the event under the description.  Given e, φ, and the context of use, what counts as relevant is 
determined.  Many things that hold in the utterance world are treated as irrelevant.  For example, suppose that Ken was in 
fact hit by a truck in the middle of the street and he failed to cross the street.  If the propositions about the truck and its 
relations to Ken are included in f(e, φ), then (4) would be predicted to be false because there is no event of Kenʼs crossing the 
street in any inertia world.  However, even if Ken was hit by a truck, we judge (4) to be true, insofar as Kenʼs action was 
sufficiently seen as crossing of the street.  This is because, given e, φ, and the context, the trajectory of a single truck is 
normally irrelevant for his action, e, to complete.  Perhaps a black hole swallowed the earth and Kenʼs attempt fell short.  But 
such a cosmic catastrophe is normally irrelevant to e and φ.  Thus, the set of possible worlds that are compatible with the 
relevant propositions include both types of worlds where Ken is hit by a truck in the middle of the street and where he is not.
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might as well say, ʻhe merely wanted to cross the street; he wasnʼt really crossing the streetʼ.  
Nishiyama shows that Portnerʼs analysis applies to both progressive and perfect interpretations of -te-i- 
in Japanese with a small modification.  Recall that, according to Portner, a progressive sentence is true iff 
you have a proper part of a described type of event in all inertia worlds.  This is because if you have a non-
proper part of an event, say Kenʼs crossing the street, then you would have the whole event of his crossing 
the street because everything is part of itself.  Then the sentence Ken is crossing the street would be true 
even when he has already crossed the street.  That is a wrong prediction.  Thus, we need to use a proper 
part-whole relation to represent a progressive interpretation.
Japanese -te-i- constructions, however, express both progressive and perfect interpretations.  Nishiyama 
suggests to replace the proper part-hood relation with the simpler part-whole relation to ambiguously 
represent both ongoing events for the progressive and culminated events for the perfect.  Just as English 
progressives, a -te-i- construction has a progressive interpretation if you have a proper part of a described 
event.  Additionally, it has a perfect reading if you have a non-proper part of a described event, i.e., the 
whole event.  For example, (3) is true when there is an event that is non-proper part of (namely, identical to) 
the event of Kenʼs running in all inertia worlds.  That is, (3) is true when Ken has already finished running. 
A -te-i- construction is not only true of an ongoing event of a certain kind, but also true of a completed 
event of the same kind.  That is why the -te-i- construction can have two different interpretations.  I skip 
the compositional and further details of Nishiyamaʼs analysis, which are not important for our purposes. 
Overall, -te-i- introduces a state that is a result of an event such that it is (proper or not) part of a described 
event in all inertia worlds. 16  Now I apply this analysis to knowledge attributions in Japanese.  
2.3 The analysis of Japanese knowledge attributions 
As we have seen in Section 2.1, Japanese propositional knowledge attributions, such as (5) below, have to 
include an occurrence of -te-i-.
 (5) Boku-wa kuruma-ga chusyajo-ni tomatteiru koto-o si-te-i-ru.
  I-Top car-Nom parking.lot-Dat parking Nominalizer-Acc si-te-i-Nonpast
  ʻI know that my car is parked in the parking lot.ʼ
16 Something like (a) can be used to represent the proposition expressed by a use of (3), which is true at w iff there is a state 
that is a result of an event such that it is either ongoing part of Kenʼs running or identical to Kenʼs running in all inertia 
worlds. 
  (a)  λw .∃s∃e[PRES(s) ∧ e → s ∧ [ ∀ w′ : w′∈ I(e, λe . λw . e is Kenʼs running in w)][∃e′ (e ≤ e′∧ e′ is Kenʼs 
running in w′)]]  
(where ʻe ≤ e′ʼ means that e is part of e′ without requiring e to be proper part of e′ and ʻe → sʼ means that s is a 
result or consequence of e.) 
 (a) is compatible with both progressive and perfect interpretations as expected.  In Nishiyamaʼs account, the morphemes -te- 
and -i- are treated separately: each morpheme incrementally makes a contribution to the overall meaning of the entire 
sentence.  Both -te- and -i- are operators on predicates of eventualities.  -te- basically plays the same role as the English 
progressive morpheme, whereas -i- is a ʻstativizerʼ, which returns a predicate of states rather than events.  
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Now we know that a -te-i- sentence can have a progressive or a perfect interpretation.  But recall that the 
main verb si- to which -te-i- is attached is analogous to find out, discover, etc.  If (5) has a progressive 
meaning and the subject is still in the process of finding out or discovering a certain fact, then (5) would 
not be understood as a propositional knowledge attribution.  How could one be said to know that p if she 
has not yet figured out that p?  So I assume that (5) has a perfect interpretation.  Let ʻPʼ stand for the 
proposition that my car is parked in the lot.  On Nishiyamaʼs analysis, (5) is true iff there is a state that is a 
consequence of my finding out that P in all inertia worlds.
This analysis supports epistemic contextualism because the set of inertia worlds is contextually 
determined.  A major argument for epistemic contextualism is that we genuinely judge one and the same 
knowledge attributing sentence to be true in one context and false in another. 17  Now I want to discuss how 
this analysis accounts for our shifting intuitions.  Inertia worlds are determined by a modal base and an 
ordering source.  Modal base f(e, φ) for (5) is determined based on what is relevant to the culmination of 
my finding out that P in this context.  What is relevant to finding out a certain fact?  There seem to be a 
number of necessary conditions for one to find out something, such as oneʼs external environment and 
mental capacities.  But here I want to focus on one important factor.  Taking David Lewisʼs analysis of 
knowledge attributions as a starting point, I suggest that, for a given proposition p, what is primarily 
relevant for me to find out that p in a certain context is whether I obtain evidence that eliminates some 
relevant not-p possibilities in that context.  Lewis says, ʻS knows that P iff Sʼs evidence eliminates every 
possibility in which not-P—Psst!—except for those possibilities that we are properly ignoringʼ. 18  So, 
according to Lewis, one needs to have evidence for her to know something.  Similarly, I suggest that one 
needs to have evidence for her to find out something.  Thus, f(e, φ) for (5) includes, at least, the 
propositions relevant to whether I obtain evidence that supports P.
Now let us consider g(e, φ) for (5), which constrains the outside factors that could prevent me from 
finding out that P.  g(e, φ) is required because, normally, the totality of evidence I have for P does not 
eliminate all not-P possibilities.  For example, imagine that I utter (5) in an ordinary context merely to 
report where I will go to pick up my car.  Nothing important hangs on my utterance.  In this context I 
sincerely assert (5) because, perhaps, I remember that I parked my car in the parking lot.  The fact that I 
remember that I parked in the lot provides evidence for P.  This piece of evidence, however, cannot 
eliminate all not-P possibilities.  The fact that I remember so is compatible with many other ways in which 
not-P holds.  The car might have been stolen.  That is, f(e, φ) contains both P and not-P worlds.  But here 
we can introduce g(e, φ), which lists all those outside factors that are required to hold for the event in the 
context to culminate.  g(e, φ) includes the propositions such as ʻI am not clinically forgetfulʼ, ʻCar theft is 
rare in this area; the car has not been stolenʼ, ʻI am not a brain in a vatʼ, etc.  If any of these propositions 
does not hold, then the event of finding out that P would not hold even when I remember that I parked in 
17 DeRose, op. cit., Chapter 2.
18 Lewis, D., “Elusive knowledge” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 1996, pp.549-67.
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the lot.  Given f(e, φ) and g(e, φ), we can obtain I(e, φ), the best worlds with which we evaluate (5).  In this 
ordinary context, I(e, φ) does not include any not-P-world where my finding out that P is interrupted.  Thus, 
the fact that I remember that I parked in the lot indeed eliminates all not-P possibilities within I(e, φ). 
Therefore, I obtain enough evidence for P in all of the contextually selected inertia worlds.  That is, (5) is 
true.
It is important to remind ourselves that an ordering source, g(e, φ), is context-sensitive.  What counts as 
an outside factor shifts depending on the ways in which we elaborate the scenario in question.  Suppose 
that a detective visits me and inquires if I am really sure that my car is parked in the lot.  Something very 
urgent and consequential is contingent on my answer.  Now we tend to, at least, withhold our assent to (5). 
This is because the presented scenario invites us to modify g(e, φ).  g(e, φ) reflects our expectations or 
some standard of normalcy.  g(e, φ) for the ordinary context presumes that what typically takes place 
indeed does so; it assumes that the car has not been stolen.  But the atypical presence of a detective invites 
us to modify such stereotypical expectations.  For example, we might remove from g(e, φ) the proposition 
that my car has not been stolen.  Given the new scenario, such a possibility cannot be considered to be an 
outside factor.  Assuming we still have the same modal base, we obtain the inertia worlds that are 
undetermined about whether the car has been stolen or not.  The fact that I remember I parked my car in 
the lot does not eliminate the possibility that the car has been stolen.  Thus, it is not the case that I found 
out that P in all inertia worlds; in some inertia worlds, P does not hold and I cannot find out that P. 
Therefore, the presented analysis indeed predicts our shifting intuitions about various uses of (5). 19
3. Stanley’s Argument against Modal Contextualism 
In this section I will discuss Stanleyʼs argument against modal contextualism and argue that it does not 
apply to the presented modal analysis of Japanese knowledge attributions.  Stanleyʼs basic line of reasoning 
against modal contextualism goes as follows.  Consider the pair (6) and (7), which contain multiple 
occurrences of a modal and a knowledge expression respectively.  In (6) two different speakers use the 
same modal expression it is possible in two different senses.  Stanley claims that (7) is structurally 
analogous to (6), and that they form a minimal pair.  If know is context-sensitive in an analogous way to 
modal expressions, such as it is possible and can, then we would be able to use know in more than one 
sense as well; (6) and (7) would be equally felicitous.  Stanley points out, however, that (6) is clearly 
19 Although this article does not fully explore the issue, the modal analysis also seems able to account for our intuitions 
concerning Gettier cases.  A modal base for (5) can shift depending on the circumstances of the event in question, of which 
the speaker may or may not be aware.  The fact that I remember I parked in the lot might have nothing to do with what is 
relevant to finding out that P in a Gettier case; some other kind of evidence is required for me to find out that P.  What is 
included in a modal base varies from context to context.  Recall the Cold War example: being in good physical condition is 
not enough for one to cross the street on the border of Western and Eastern Berlin.  Sentence Ken is crossing the street can be 
false in such a circumstance.  Thus, the modal analysis predicts (5) to be false in a Gettier context, even if I remember that I 
parked in the lot.  The fact that I remember it would have provided enough evidence in a different context, but not in a 
Gettier context.  
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felicitous, whereas (7) is not.  Therefore, know is not context-sensitive in an analogous way to it is possible. 
 (6) TECHNOLOGY
   A. Itʼs possible to fly from London to New York City in 30 minutes.
   B.  Thatʼs absurd!  No flights available to the public today would allow you to do that.  Itʼs not 
possible to fly from London to New York City in 30 minutes.
   A.  I didnʼt say it was.  I wasnʼt talking about whatʼs possible given what is available to the 
public, but rather what is possible given all existing technology. 
 (7) ZOO
   A. (looking at a zebra in a normal zoo).  I know that is a zebra.
   B. But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule?
   A. I guess I canʼt rule that out.
   B. So you admit that you donʼt know thatʼs a zebra, and so you were wrong earlier?
   A.  #I didnʼt say I did.  I wasnʼt considering the possibility that it could be a cleverly painted 
mule. 20
Two speakers A and B in (6) both seem to speak truly because they are speaking of two different types of 
possibility: technological possibility and practical possibility.  It is technologically but not practically 
possible to fly from London to New York City in 30 minutes.  What ʻflavorʼ of possibility a modal phrase 
expresses depends on how its domain of quantification is restricted.  The sentence It’s possible to fly from 
London to New York City in 30 minutes is true with respect to the domain of technological possibilities but 
not true with respect to the domain of practical possibilities.  Speaker Aʼs use of it’s possible should be 
understood in terms of one domain, while Bʼs use should be understood in terms of the other.  The last 
utterance of (6) is acceptable; A is not contradicting herself by denying the practical possibility of traveling 
in 30 minutes because she was not talking about the practical possibility at all.  In contrast, the final 
utterance of (7) is clearly unacceptable.  The speakers in (7) seem unable to appeal to two different senses 
of know.  We seem unable to assign two different domains of quantification to resolve their disagreement. 
Stanley claims that this is because the verb know is not a context-sensitive expression.
Whether this argument is sound for English, it cannot be reproduced in Japanese given our analysis of 
Japanese knowledge attributions.  The analysis explains why the Japanese counterparts of (6) and (7), (8) 
and (9) below, do not constitute a minimal pair and thereby fail to apply to Japanese.  
20 Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interest, pp.52-3.
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 (8) TECHNOLOGY 21
   A. London kara New York e 30 pun de  tobu koto-wa kanoo desu.
    London from New York to 30 min. in  fly Nominalizer-Top possible be.polite
    ʻItʼs possible to fly from London to New York City in 30 minutes.ʼ
   B. (Thatʼs absurd!  No flights available to the public today would allow you to do that.
    Itʼs not possible to fly from London to New York City in 30 minutes.)
   A. Sono toori jissai-wa  dekimasen.  
    That right actuality-Top cannot.polite.  
    ʻYou are right.  We cannot actually do so.ʼ
    Demo sooiu imi de  kanoo da to ittanja naidesu.
    But that sense in  possible be as said not.polite
    ʻBut I didnʼt say ʻitʼs possibleʼ in that sense.ʼ
 (9) ZOO
   A. Watasi-wa are-ga simauma da to si-te-i-masu.
    I-Top that-Nom zebra is that know-polite 
    ʻI know that is a zebra.ʼ
   B. (But can you rule out its being a cleverly painted mule?)
   A. (I guess I canʼt rule that out.)
   B. (So you admit that you donʼt know thatʼs a zebra, and so you were wrong earlier?)
   A. Sono  toori sirimasen.
    That right know.not.polite.
    ʻThatʼs right.  I donʼt know.ʼ
    #Demo sooiu imi de si-te-i-ru to ittanja naidesu.
    But that sense in know as said  not.polite
    ʻBut I didnʼt say ʻI knowʼ in that sense.ʼ
Here we can observe a contrast between kanoo da (ʻitʼs possibleʼ) and si-te-i-ru (ʻknowʼ) that is similar to 
what Stanley finds in (6) and (7). 22  In (8) speaker A explicitly denies the sense of kanoo da (ʻitʼs possibleʼ) 
intended by speaker B, whereas, in (9), the analogous sentence with si-te-i-ru (ʻknowʼ) is unacceptable. 
This might appear to support the anti-contextualist conclusion that si-te-i-ru is not a context-sensitive 
expression.  Our analysis of Japanese knowledge attributions, however, accounts for why kanoo da and si-
te-i-ru behave differently in (8) and (9).  
Assuming Kratzerʼs theory of modality, we can explain the two different senses of kanoo da in (8) in two 
21 I translate only the key sentences in each dialogue.  Those in parentheses are to be understood as Japanese sentences.
22 Yukio Irie does not find the last utterance of (9) so unnatural (p.c.).  If his intuition is widely shared, then the pair 
straightforwardly shows that Stanleyʼs argument against modal contextualism is inapplicable to Japanese.
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different ways.  First, we can assign two different types of modal bases to A and Bʼs uses of kanoo da: Aʼs 
f(e, φ) includes the worlds in which everything that is technologically possible indeed takes place, while Bʼ
s f(e, φ) includes the worlds in which everything that is practically possible takes place.  As a result, A and 
Bʼs uses of kanoo da can express a different flavor of possibility.  Second, alternatively, we can assign two 
different types of ordering sources to the occurrences of kanoo da: Aʼs g(e, φ) expresses the norm of our 
technological excellence, which can be paraphrased as ʻgiven what our technology allowsʼ, whereas Bʼs g(e, 
φ) expresses the norm of airline industry, ʻgiven the available flightsʼ.  As a result, again, Aʼs use of kanoo 
da has a different interpretation from Bʼs.  The important point to remember is that different types of f(e, φ) 
or g(e, φ) are available to interpret the occurrences of kanoo da in (8).
In contrast, in (9), we cannot assign two different types of ordering sources to two different occurrences 
of si-te-i-ru.  Both A and B use the same type of ordering source, g(e, φ), namely, the list of outside factors 
that we expect to hold given e, φ, and the context, which we might paraphrase simply as ʻgiven what is 
normal in this contextʼ.  We can describe the situation in the following way.  B is pointing out that Aʼs 
understanding of the property of ʻbeing what is normal in this contextʼ is insufficient and a proposition must 
be removed from Aʼs g(e, φ).  For example, B can be seen as suggesting to remove the proposition that a 
zebra-like animal is a zebra.  Let us call this proposition ʻZʼ.  If Z is not an outside factor, A cannot assume 
Z to hold.  Z must be supported by her evidence.  Z is, however, necessary for A to eliminate the possibility 
that what A sees is not a zebra.  Without Z in g(e, φ), A cannot claim that A knows that what she sees is a 
zebra because her perceptual evidence cannot rule out the possibility that she is looking at a cleverly 
painted mule.  If A concedes Bʼs point, then both occurrences of si-te-i-ru must be understood with respect 
to the same ordering source, which makes Aʼs last utterance unacceptable.
I have argued that (8) and (9) do not form a minimal pair because the former can involve more than one 
type of modal base or ordering source, whereas the latter cannot.  If we want to have a minimal pair, we 
have to pair (9) with the cases in which two speakers disagree with one another about the precise nature of 
a single g(e, φ), not those cases where we can assign two distinct types of modal bases or ordering sources, 
as in (8).  Consider the following scenario, where A and B are looking for a parking space on campus. 
 (10) PARKING
   A. Koko-wa yoji iko kuruma-o tomeru koto-ga  dekimasu.
    here-Top 4.oclock after car-Acc park Nominalizer-Nom can.polite
    ʻItʼs possible to park here after 4 pm.ʼ
    (because I read the sign before)
   B. Iya, dekinai desuyo. 
    No, cannot be.polite
    ʻNo, itʼs not possible.ʼ
    (They updated the rules and we would get a ticket.)
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   A. (Glad you know the update.)
   B. (So you admit that you were wrong earlier in saying that itʼs possible to park here?)
   A. Sono toori dekinai desu.  
    That right cannot  be.polite.
    ʻThatʼs right.  Itʼs not possible to park here.ʼ  
    #Demo sooiu imi de dekiru to ittanja naidesu.
    But that sense in can as  said not.polite
    ʻBut I didnʼt say ʻitʼs possibleʼ in that sense.ʼ
The modal word deki- here is more or less synonymous with it’s possible, which is understood as 
introducing a quantification over some normative worlds, where every regulation is observed.  By saying 
that ʻitʼs possible to park hereʼ, A claims that she would be observing the regulations if she parked her car at 
the location.  The ordering source, g(e, φ), can be seen as expressing the set of regulations to be observed 
in this context.  In (10) Aʼs understanding of g(e, φ) is shown to be dated; B corrects Aʼs misunderstanding 
of g(e, φ).  The relevant parking regulations are the latest ones.  Insofar as A concedes that Bʼs 
understanding of g(e, φ) is the correct one, A cannot introduce an irrelevant ordering source to make her 
previous statement true.  In both (9) and (10) A and B use a single type of ordering source, which makes 
them a minimal pair.  And the last utterance of (10) is indeed as infelicitous as that of (9).  Therefore, 
Stanleyʼs argument against modal contextualism cannot be reproduced in Japanese. 
 （いずみゆう　メリーランド大学）
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文脈主義と日本語の知識帰属
和泉　悠
本稿の主な目的は、認識論的文脈主義 epistemic contextualism の言語学的な基礎を、言語横断
的な側面から考察することである。そのために、日本語を対象言語として、認識論的文脈主義の
可能性を模索する。私は本稿において、日本語の知識を表現する動詞「知っている」が、複合的
かつ文脈依存的な様相表現として分析できると主張する。この分析は西山淳子による日本語のア
スペクト「てい」の様相分析に依拠する。西山のアスペクト「てい」の分析は、文脈依存性に基
づいた標準的な様相表現分析を利用するため、日本語の「知っている」が文脈依存表現であるこ
とが導かれる。日本語における「S が P を知っている」は、おおよそ、「S は、すべての慣性世
界 inertia worlds において、P であることを知ったという出来事の帰結状態にある」ということを
意味する。この「知っている」の様相分析は、知識帰属文に関する、文脈に応じたわれわれの直
観の変化をうまく説明することができる。さらに、本稿の後半では、Jason Stanley が提出した、
英語における知識動詞の様相分析に対する反論が、ここで提出された日本語知識動詞の様相分析
には当てはまらない、ということを示す。
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認識論、認識的文脈主義、日本語知識帰属文、「〜ている」、様相分析
